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ABSTRACT
We study duopoly competition between two interconnected
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) that compete in quality
and prices for both Content Providers (CPs) and consumers.
We develop a game theoretic model using a two-sided market
framework, where ISP's are modeled as interconnected plat-
forms with quality bottlenecks; a consumer on a low quality
platform accessing content on a high quality platform expe-
riences low quality. Platforms ¯rst pick quality levels from
a bounded interval and in the subsequent stages compete in
prices for both CP's and consumers. CP's are heterogenous
in content quality which is uniformly distributed between
[° ¡ 1;°]. We ¯rst establish the existence of a price sub-
game perfect equilibrium (SPE) given any asymmetric pair
of platform quality choices. We show that the higher the
asymmetry, the more likely the CP market is to be uncov-
ered if the average content quality (represented by °) is low.
In contrast, if ° is high then the market is always covered.
We then show that an SPE for the whole game exists and
characterize all the equilibrium choices of the quality game.
In particular, we show that the equilibria involve either max-
imal di®erentiation or partial di®erentiation depending on
°. Moreover, we characterize the resulting market con¯gu-
rations in the ¯nal stage and show that they depend on °
and the asymmetry between platforms represented by the
ratio of the qualities.
1. INTRODUCTION
Consumers and Content Providers (CPs) base their choice
of ISP not only on prices but also on other features such as
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speed of access, special add-ons like spam blocking and virus
protection [2]. These extra features can be abstracted as
quality. ISP's have the ability to in°uence quality through
upgrade of infrastructure, o®ering of enhanced services or
even tra±c-management [4]. A key question that arises in
the provision of network access is what quality pro¯t maxi-
mizing ISP's will o®er in a competitive environment and its
concomitant e®ect on market coverage.
In this paper we study this question using a model of duopoly
competition in interconnected two-sided-market platforms
in the presence of quality choice. We develop a game-theoretic
model where ISP's are represented as pro¯t maximizing two-
sided interconnected platforms that choose quality levels and
then compete in prices for both CP's and consumers. In ad-
dition, we model quality of service e®ects through a bottle-
neck e®ect. While there is much work on competition mod-
els between two-sided platforms (see for example, [9, 1, 10,
6]), most existing work focuses on determinants of pricing.
These works do not address interconnection between plat-
forms, endogenous quality choice by platforms and market
coverage. In this paper we consider these e®ects in tandem.
Our objective is to understand what strategic quality choices
interconnected platforms make and their e®ects on market
structure.
Our model consists of two interconnected platforms, a het-
erogenous mass of CP's, and a heterogenous mass of con-
sumers. Platforms provide connection services to consumers
and CP's and charge a °at access fee to both. We model
the interaction between ISP's and end-users
1 as a six-stage
game. In the ¯rst stage, platforms simultaneously pick a
quality level from a bounded interval. Second, they simulta-
neously compete in CP prices. Third, the CP's decide which
platforms, if any, to connect to. Fourth, the platforms si-
multaneously compete in consumer prices. In the ¯fth stage,
consumers decide what platforms to join. In the last stage
consumers decide which CP's to patronize.
We ¯rst derive results relating to the price competition SPE
between the platforms given exogenous quality choices and
then use these results to solve for the quality choice SPE.
The results show that given an asymmetric quality pair, a
subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) in both consumer and
CP prices exists. In addition, we show the relationship be-
tween the ISPs' quality choices and market structure on the
1The term end-users refers to both CP's and ConsumersCP side. Speci¯cally, we show that the resulting market
con¯guration depends on the average content quality char-
acteristic, °, of the CP's and the asymmetry between the
platforms. We show that if ° is low, then an increase in
the quality ratio, I, de¯ned as the ratio between platform
qualities, increases the platforms market power resulting in
an uncovered content provider market. On the other hand,
when ° is high, the relative di®erence in content quality
amongst CP's diminishes and content providers make sim-
ilar connection decisions regardless of quality ratio levels,
i.e., they all join the high quality network. The above re-
sults suggest that platforms which are highly di®erentiated
in quality pose a barrier to entry for CP's that have low con-
tent quality. Indeed, the high asymmetry in quality induces
market power on the platforms which enables them to raise
prices and thus exclude low quality content CP's from the
market.
Our second set of results pertain to the quality choice SPE.
We show that if we assume a ¯xed cost (or costless) qual-
ity investment model, then an SPE in quality choice stage
exists. We characterize all such equilibria and show that de-
pending on °, one of the following three types of equilibrium
exists in the ¯nal stage of the game: a)Maximal di®erenti-
ation equilibrium which involves one platform picking the
highest quality and the other the lowest, b)Partial di®er-
entiation equilibrium where one platform picks the highest
quality and the other chooses a proportion of the highest
quality that depends on °, c)Partial di®erentiation where
one platform picks the lowest quality and the other picks
some positive fraction of the highest quality.
In addition, we also give the market con¯gurations that arise
at the various SPE. In particular, we show that the CP
market is covered when ° is high or when it is low and
the bounded interval from which quality is chosen is small.
In the former case the heterogeneity between CP's is low.
Therefore, if one CP joins a platform all the others make
a similar decision as previously discussed and the market
is covered. In the latter case, though the heterogeneity is
high, the bounded interval from which quality is chosen is
small and thus the level of di®erentiation is limited. This im-
plies that price competition results in low prices such that
the market is covered. When ° is low and the bounded
interval from which quality is chosen is large, the CP mar-
ket is uncovered. In this case the level of di®erentiation
is large. Platforms exercise market power charging higher
prices which leads to less enrollment of CP's and an uncov-
ered market.
Other than the papers cited above on two sided-markets,
our paper builds on contributions to the industrial organi-
zation literature on price competition and quality choice in
vertically di®erentiated markets, [5, 13, 3, 7, 11]. Some-
what related to our work are the competition models ana-
lyzed in Mussachio et al [8]. Although they study the e®ect
of net neutrality on CP investments and network quality,
their neutral and non-neutral models can be independently
viewed as modeling competition between network providers
where quality choice is endogenous. In both of these models,
the providers are assumed to be symmetric. Moreover, con-
sumers and CP's are viewed as homogenous and the user
base on both sides of the market is ¯xed. The resulting
equilibrium in network quality is therefore symmetric with
all network providers choosing the same quality. Issues of
market coverage are also not addressed. The distinguishing
feature our work is to consider the strategic interactions be-
tween quality-picking platforms and heterogenous end-users
and their e®ect on market entry by the CP's.
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2
we present the model. In Section 3 we analyze the model
solving for the SPE of this game as well as discussing our
¯ndings. In Section 4 we conclude. Due to space limitations
certain proofs have been omitted and those that are essential
have been relegated to the Appendix.
2. MODEL
We consider two platforms denoted by ® and ¯, and a contin-
uum of consumers and content providers with a unit volume.
Let y® and y¯ be the quality-of-service chosen by platforms
® and ¯, respectively. We represent the quality of a CP
j by the scalar °j. We assume °j is uniformly distributed
with support [° ¡ 1;°] where ° ¸ 1. We also assume °j are
independent identically distributed random variables across
the population of content providers. Let Á : [0;1] ! f®;¯g
and b Á : [0;1] ! f®;¯g be mappings from the space of con-
sumers and providers respectively to the set of platforms. A
consumer i on a platform Á(i) 2 f®;¯g connecting to a CP
j on platform b Á(j) 2 f®;¯g receives utility,
uij(yÁ(i);yb Á(j);°j) = °j + minfyÁ(i);yb Á(j)g: (1)
The consumer utility implies that a consumer on a high qual-
ity platform, connecting to a content provider present on a
high quality platform, receives more utility than if he con-
nected to a content provider of the same quality on the lower
quality platform. In essence, utility captures the fact that
service quality depends on the bottleneck, see [12].
A consumer i on platform Á(i) connects with CP j if and
only if uij ¸ 0. Let Fi(yÁ(i);r®;r¯;°) be the quality per-
ceived by consumer i when he joins platform Á(i). Formally,
Fi(yÁ(i);r®;r¯;°) =
Z 1
0
E
h
maxfuij(yÁ(i);yb Á(j);°j);0g
i
dj:
Here r® and r¯ are the masses of content providers that join
platform ® and ¯ respectively. We assume that consumers
have heterogenous preferences represented by a taste param-
eter µi which is uniformly distributed in the interval [0,1].
A consumer i perceives the quality of platform Á(i) as his
expected utility, Fi(yÁ(i);r®;r¯;°). In addition, each con-
sumer has a reservation utility R. The prices charged by
the platforms are p® and p¯ for platforms ® and ¯ respec-
tively. Each consumer connects to at most one platform but
once connected has access to all content due to the inter-
connection of the platforms. Therefore, the net utility of a
consumer i connecting to platform Á(i) is given by,
Ui(Á(i)) = maxfR + µiFi(yÁ(i);r®;r¯;°) ¡ pÁ(i);0g:
Consumers prefer the platform with the higher perceived
quality, ceteris paribus.
2Market entry is proxied by market coverage.Platforms also charge a ¯xed connection fee w® and w¯ to
CP's that connect to them. We assume that CP's make rev-
enues by selling advertising. Let q® and q¯ denote the mass
of consumers locating on platforms ® and ¯ respectively.
Without loss of generality we assume y® ¸ y¯. We also
assume that yÁ(i) > ² for some ² > 0, where ² is some min-
imum quality level that platforms have to guarantee. The
utility vj of a CP j is de¯ned to be his pro¯t
vj = V (°j;y®;y¯;q®;q¯) ¡ wb Á(j); (2)
where,
V (¢) =
(
g(°j;y®)q® + g(°j;y¯)q¯; if b Á(j) = ®;
g(°j;y¯)q¯ + g(°j;y¯)q®; if b Á(j) = ¯:
Here g(°j;yb Á(i)) is a function that represents the advert price
and is increasing in both parameters; CP j gets a higher
advert price for having a higher content quality and also for
locating on a platform with higher quality. The function
V (°j;y®;y¯;q®;q¯) represents the gross revenue earned by
a CP j. This function depends on which platform the CP
joins as well as the number of consumers on the other side
of the market. In particular, if a CP j joins the high quality
platform, it is able to command a higher advert price for
connections arising from consumers on that platform. If a
CP joins the lower quality platform its advert price is the
same for the two platforms, i.e, the advert price depends on
the platform that acts as the bottleneck.
Finally we consider the payo® functions of the platforms:
we assume that platforms incur no cost(or a ¯xed cost) in
choosing the quality level. The payo® of platform ®, which
we denote by ¼®, is given by
¼® = p®q® + w®r®;
where q® is the mass of consumers attached to platform ®
and r® is the mass of CP's attached to platform ®. The
payo® for platform ¯ is similar. The model we have outlined
corresponds to a dynamic game with the following timing of
events:
1) Quality Choice Stage: Platforms ® and ¯ simultane-
ously choose quality-of-service from the interval [²;y:]
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2) Pricing Decisions: Platforms simultaneously choose con-
nection fees w® and w¯.
3) Connection Decisions: CPs decide which platform to
join.
4) Pricing Decisions: Platforms simultaneously choose prices
p® and p¯.
5) Connection Decisions: Users decide which platform to
join.
6) Consumption Decisions: Consumers decide which CPs
to connect.
3² represents a minimum quality that a platform is required
to maintain. y represents the maximum quality that can be
achieved, for instance due to technological limits.
We solve this game by considering its subgame perfect equi-
libria (SPE), which we ¯nd using backward induction. Steps
4-6 are similar to a pricing game with vertical di®erentia-
tion; steps 1-3 are similar to a quality choice and pricing
game with vertical di®erentiation.
3. MODEL ANALYSIS
Let I = f®;¯;[0;1]j;[0;1]ig denote the set of players in the
multi-stage game, where ® and ¯ are the platforms, [0;1]j
and [0;1]i are the continuum of content providers and con-
sumers respectively, both with unit volume. We denote the
information set at stage k of the game for a player i 2 I by
h
k
i . Let the set of actions available to a player i at stage k
and information set h
k
i be denoted as Ai(h
k
i ).
3.1 Consumption Decisions.
We begin by analyzing the last stage of the game, i.e, the
consumption decisions of the consumers. Only the con-
sumers make a move in this stage. The choice set of a con-
sumer i 2 [0;1]i given an information set h
k
i is Ai(h
k
i ) ½
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[0;1]j. A consumer i on a platform Á(i) 2 f®;¯g access-
ing content of a CP j on platform b Á(j) 2 f®;¯g receives
utility uij which is de¯ned in Eq. (1). As previously dis-
cussed, this implies that a consumer connecting to a higher
quality platform gets more utility when he accesses content
providers on that platform, compared to when he connects
to the same content providers while connected to the lower
quality platform. Consumer i on platform Á(i) connects with
CP j whenever uij ¸ 0 which implies that i connects with
CP j if °j ¸ ¡minfyÁ(i);yb Á(j)g. Since °j > 0, whenever a
consumer joins any of the platforms he will connect to all
content providers on that platform and those on the other
platform.
3.2 ConsumerPlatformConnectionDecisions.
In this stage the consumers are the only movers and they
decide which platforms to join. The choice set of a consumer
i given any h
k
i is Ai(h
k
i ) = f®;¯g. Through his information
set, a consumer has knowledge of the number of content
providers on each platform, the prices that the platforms
charge and the quality level of each platform. Each con-
sumer i solves the following utility maximization problem,
maximize Ui(Á(i))
s:t: Á(i) 2 f®;¯g:
A consumer that does not join any platform receives a utility
of zero. We proceed next to give the demand functions faced
by each platform based on consumer choices in this stage.
We ¯rst make the following assumption on the reservation
price which we invoke through out the analysis of this paper.
Assumption 1. R is large enough that the consumer mar-
ket is covered.
Let y® > y¯, then it follows that Fi(y®;¢) > Fi(y¯;¢). If ~ µ ´
p®¡p¯
Fi(y®;¢)¡Fi(y¯;¢) consumers with a taste parameter µi ¸ ~ µ
join the platform with the higher perceived quality, Fi(y®;¢),
since µiFi(y®;¢)¡p® ¸ µiFi(y¯;¢)¡p¯ if and only if µi ¸ ~ µ.
Those whose taste parameter µi < ~ µ will join platform ¯ ifand only if µi ¸
p¯¡R
Fi(y¯;¢). From Assumption 1 we can deduce
that if R is large enough then all consumers get a positive
utility by participating in the market. In such a market, the
demands for the platforms are characterized as follows,
q¯(p®;p¯) =
µ
p® ¡ p¯
Fi(y®;¢) ¡ Fi(y¯;¢)
¶
;
q®(p®;p¯) =
µ
1 ¡
p® ¡ p¯
Fi(y®;¢) ¡ Fi(y¯;¢)
¶
since µi is uniformly distributed on [0;1]. We will show
in the next stage that if y® = y¯ then any allocation of
demand across platforms is possible at the resulting price
equilibrium.
3.3 Platform Pricing Decisions for the Con-
sumer Side.
In this stage of the game the platforms are the only movers
and they decide what prices to charge to the consumers.
The choice set of platform i 2 f®;¯g, given any h
k
i , is
Ai(h
k
i ) = pi 2 R. Thus the platforms simultaneously decide
what prices p® and p¯ to charge to consumers. Through
his information set, a platform has knowledge of the num-
ber of content providers on each platform and the quality
level of each platform. Pro¯t for platform i is given by,
¼i = piqi + wiri; where wi is the price charged to content
providers and ri is the mass of content providers on plat-
form i. The demand for platform i denoted by qi is de¯ned
by the set of consumers who maximize their utility when
they join platform i. The Nash equilibrium in this price
subgame depends on the information set h
k
i . In particular,
if h
k
i is such that y® > y¯ it can be shown that, p¯ =
1
3(Fi(y®;¢) ¡ Fi(y¯;¢)); and p® =
2
3(Fi(y®;¢) ¡ Fi(y¯;¢));
and the consumer demands addressed to the platforms at
this equilibrium are q® =
2
3 and q¯ =
1
3. If h
k
i is such
that y® = y¯ then Fi(y®;¢) = Fi(y¯;¢). A Bertrand com-
petition ensues and the resulting subgame Nash equilibrium
has p® = p¯ = 0. The consumer demands addressed to
the platforms at this equilibrium price are indeterminate,
i.e any allocation such that q® + q¯ = 1, is a solution to the
Bertrand game.
3.4 Content Provider Connection Decisions
Given the quality of service o®ered by platforms y® and y¯
and the prices w® and w¯, the content providers decide on
which platform to locate. The choice set of a CP j given
any h
k
j is Aj(h
k
j) = f®;¯g. As mentioned in Section 3,
°j is uniformly distributed with a support [°;° ¡ 1] where
° ¸ 1. The utility vj gained by a content provider when
he joins a platform is given by Eq. (2). A CP's utility is
zero if he doesn't join any platform. In this stage, CP's take
the investment(choice) in quality as given. Moreover, they
anticipate the mass of consumers on each platform q® and
q¯. Let g(°j;yb Á(j)) = °jyb Á(j), a CP j perceives the quality
of platform ® to be y®q® + y¯q¯ and that of platform ¯ to
be y¯q® + y¯q¯.
For the rest of this section we assume y® > y¯
4. A CP j
maximizes the utility vj and is indi®erent between the two
platforms if and only if °j(y®q® + y¯q¯) ¡ w® = °j(y¯q® +
4We will show later that y® = y¯ is not a SPE
y¯q¯) ¡ w¯: Let e °j =
w®¡w¯
q®(y®¡y¯), then the content providers
with quality exceeding e °j join the high quality platform ®.
Those whose content quality is lower than e °j, but larger
than w¯=(y¯(q¯ + q®)), join the lower quality platform ¯.
The others do not join any platform. Since y® > y¯ there's a
possibility of platform ® preempting the market with a limit
price w® = w¯ + (° ¡ 1)(q®(y® ¡ y¯)). The mass of content
providers r®(r¯) is de¯ned by those content providers who
maximize vj when they join platform ®(¯). It follows that
given the n-tuple (°;y®;y¯;w®;w¯), there are four possible
market con¯gurations that may arise depending on the de-
mands addressed to the platforms. We next describe the
market con¯gurations of content providers at di®erent CP
prices.
1. Uncovered Market: r®(w®;w¯) < 1, r¯(w®;w¯) = 0. We
denote this con¯guration as CI.
2. Uncovered Market: r®(w®;w¯) + r¯(w®;w¯) < 1, 0 <
r®(w®;w¯) < 1, 0 < r¯(w®;w¯) < 1. We denote this con-
¯guration as CII.
3. Covered market: r®(w®;w¯)+r¯(w®;w¯) = 1, r®(w®;w¯)
> 0 and r¯(w®;w¯) > 0. We denote this con¯guration as
CIII.
4. Preempted covered market: r®(w®;w¯) = 1;r¯(w®;w¯) =
0: We denote this as con¯guration CIV .
3.5 PlatformPricingDecisionfortheContent
Provider Side
In this stage of the game the platforms are the only movers
and they decide what prices to charge to the CPs. The choice
set of platform i 2 f®;¯g given any h
k
i is Ai(h
k
i ) = wi 2 R.
Thus the platforms simultaneously decide what prices w®
and w¯ to charge to CPs. Before proceeding we make the
following de¯nition of a subgame price equilibrium.
Definition 1. A (subgame perfect) Nash price equilib-
rium pair (w
¤
®;w
¤
¯) is a pair of price strategies such that
¼®(w
¤
®;w
¤
¯) ¸ ¼®(w®;w
¤
¯) for all w® 2 R and ¼¯(w
¤
®;w
¤
¯) ¸
¼¯(w
¤
®;w¯) for all w¯ 2 R.
At the price subgame Nash equilibrium each platform i max-
imizes its own pro¯t, ¼i = piqi + riwi, given the other plat-
form's price strategy and has no incentive to deviate to an-
other price.
In this section, we provide results showing that given a tu-
ple (y®;y¯;°) such that y® > y¯ there exists a pure strategy
price subgame Nash equilibrium pair (w
¤
®;w
¤
¯)
5. In addi-
tion we characterize the market con¯gurations that result.
Speci¯cally, we show the conditions under which particu-
lar market con¯gurations arise depending on the parameters
°;y®;and y¯.
Our results show that the uncovered market con¯guration,
(CI), does not occur at a subgame price equilibrium. On the
other hand, we show that given a tuple (y®;y¯;°) one of the
5The actual price characterizations can be found in the LIDS
report.other con¯gurations, CII; CIII or CIV , will emerge. In
doing so, we determine the set of parametric values (°;y®;y¯)
for which these di®erent con¯gurations exist.
We prove the existence of the price SPE by a construction
argument. The proofs, which are omitted due to space limi-
tations
6, involve ¯rst identifying candidate equilibrium price
pairs in each possible market con¯guration. We then check
to see whether these price equilibrium pairs are indeed Nash
equilibria of the price subgame. We do so by verifying that
the equilibrium price candidates are best replies on the whole
domain of strategies: That is, not only are they best re-
sponses in their respective market con¯gurations but that
they are also best replies if the other market con¯gurations
are taken into account.
For ease of presenting our ¯rst theorem that summarizes the
above results we de¯ne the following sets of prices which we
use in the theorem,
RII = f(w®;w¯)jr® + r¯ < 1; r® > 0; r¯ > 0g;
RIII = f(w®;w¯)jr® + r¯ = 1; r® > 0; r¯ > 0g;
RIV = f(w®;w¯)jr® + r¯ = 1; r® = 1; r¯ = 0g:
The sets RII; RIII and RIV consists of price pairs (w®;w¯)
that result in con¯guration CII; CIII and CIV respec-
tively. We next present a theorem that shows for any tuple
(°;y®;y¯), a price subgame Nash equilibrium exists and only
one market con¯guration is feasible. In addition, for market
con¯gurations CII and CIII, the price characterizations
are unique.
Theorem 1. Let Assumption 1 hold. Given (°;y®;y¯)
there exists a Nash equilibrium pair (w
¤
®;w
¤
¯) in the price-
subgame. Moreover, the resulting market con¯guration is
unique and the following hold:
1. If 1 < ° <
5y¯+22y®
9(y¯+2y®), then the equilibrium price pair is
unique and (w
¤
®;w
¤
¯) 2 RII.
2. If
5y¯+22y®
9(y¯+2y®) · ° · min
n
y¯+8y®
3(2y®+y¯);
17y¯+10y®
3(2y®+7y¯)
o
then the
equilibrium price pair is unique and (w
¤
®;w
¤
¯) 2 RIII.
3. If
17y¯+10y®
3(2y®+7y¯) < ° <
7
6 then the equilibrium price pair is
unique and (w
¤
®;w
¤
¯) 2 RIII.
4. If max
n
7
6;
y¯+8y®
3(2y®+y¯)
o
· ° < 1 then (w
¤
®;w
¤
¯) 2 RIV.
Figure 1 shows the resulting market con¯gurations for dif-
ferent values of the investment ratio, y®=y¯ = I, and the
average CP quality characteristic, °. In particular, given a I
and °, Figure 1 shows the distinct resulting market con¯gu-
ration. For a ¯xed I as the quality characteristic ° increases
the covered market is more likely. At the extreme, when °
is high, the CPs content qualities are relatively close to each
other since as ° ! 1, the ratio
°
°¡1 ! 1. Thus CPs are less
distinguishable from each other; a decision made by a CP
will be mirrored by the other close CPs and a covered mar-
ket is likely. On the other hand, for a ¯xed value of low °,
6The proofs can be found in the LIDS technical report
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Figure 1: Content Quality Characteristic ° versus
Investment Ratio y®=y¯ = I and Resulting Market
Con¯gurations
.
as the investment ratio increases the two platforms become
more di®erentiated. This means that the platforms can ex-
ert some market power. Speci¯cally, one platform serves
the high quality CP market and the other the low quality
CP market. Price competition becomes less intense as the
two platforms focus on di®erent markets. This softening of
price competition results in an uncovered market because
the platforms pricing strategies involve them pricing above
the utility that would be derived by the lowest quality CP.
However, for a ¯xed high °, the relative closeness of the con-
tent providers quality, dominates the di®erentiation e®ects
of the platforms and a preempted covered market is realized
as all CP's °ock to one platform.
3.6 Quality Choice
In this stage of the game the platforms are the only movers
and they decide what quality to set. We assume that once
platforms are in operation, quality choice is costless. The
choice set of platform i 2 f®;¯g given any h
k
i is Ai(h
k
i ) = yi
where yi 2 [²;y]. Thus the platforms simultaneously decide
what quality to choose. We ¯nd the equilibrium quality
choices by considering the best reply responses of the two
platforms. We ¯nd the set that contains platform ¯'s best
replies to platform ®'s choices and vice versa. We then ana-
lyze the points where these sets intersect and show that they
indeed are the subgame perfect equilibria. Due to space lim-
itations the analysis is provided in Appendices A.1 and A.2.
For ease of presenting the Theorem that characterizes the
subgame perfect equilibrium of the quality choice game, and
the Corollaries that characterize the resulting market con-
¯gurations, we make the following classi¯cations: C.1 1 <
° <
7
6; C.2
7
6 · ° <
24
18 and ² ¸ ¡y
2(3°¡4)
3°¡1 ; C.3
7
6 · ° <
24
18 and ² < ¡y
2(3°¡4)
3°¡1 ; C.4 ° ¸
8
6 The above classi¯cations
follow from the analysis in the Appendix where we parti-
tion the range in which ° lies into three sections depending
on the types of market con¯gurations that are possible in
each partition. From a qualitative view, the partitions rep-
resent the ranges in which the average content quality is
low, medium or high. In the medium range we make two
further classi¯cations that depend on the bounded interval
from which quality is chosen. For a given ° in the medium
range, if the bounds satisfy condition C.2(C.3) then we have
a small(large) quality choice range.We will now present the theorem that characterizes the re-
sults of the quality choice game.
Theorem 2. Given (°;y;²) there exists a subgame per-
fect Nash equilibrium (SPE) in the quality choice game. More-
over, the following hold:
(i)If C.1 holds then the SPE entails maximal di®erentiation
where one platform chooses the best quality, y, and the other
chooses the lowest quality, ².
(ii) If C.2 or C.4 holds then the SPE entails partial to max-
imal di®erentiation where one platform chooses a quality,
~ y 2 [f(y;²);y], and the other chooses the lowest quality, ².
(iii) If C.3 holds then the SPE entails one platform choos-
ing the highest quality, y, and the other one choosing a
proportion of y that depends on the average quality char-
acteristic, °. In particular, the low quality platform picks
yl = ¡y
2(3°¡4)
3°¡1 .
In general, the above results suggest that the platforms dif-
ferentiate in platform quality to soften price competition. If
the platforms are undi®erentiated both platforms earn zero
pro¯ts due to Bertrand price competition on both sides of
the market. Therefore, platforms have incentive to choose
di®erent quality levels in equilibrium. The level of the dif-
ferentiation depends on the average CP quality characteris-
tic, °. When ° is low, platforms soften price competition
through maximal di®erentiation, i.e. one platform picks the
highest quality and the other the lowest. This enables the
platforms to corner di®erent segments of the market and
exert market power.
When ° is in the medium range the resulting equilibrium
depends on the quality choice interval, [²;y]. If the qual-
ity choice interval is large, platforms di®erentiate between
themselves with one picking the highest quality while the
other picks a fraction that is a function of °. As ° increases
this fraction diminishes and platforms become more di®er-
entiated. Since the CP's are less heterogenous for higher
values of °, there is a more intense competition for them
by the platforms. To soften this competition platforms also
increase the level of di®erentiation in quality. Hence the pos-
itive correlation between ° and the level of di®erentiation.
In contrast, when the quality choice interval is small, plat-
forms still di®erentiate between themselves but with one
picking the lowest quality while the other picks either the
highest quality or some fraction of it(which is higher than
the lowest quality). Since the quality choice interval is small,
the level of di®erentiation is bounded. Indeed, no amount
of di®erentiation is able to segment the market. Therefore
a ¯erce competition ensues and a pre-empted market con-
¯guration where all CP's join one platform results. Since
there are multiple price equilibria in this con¯guration there
also exists multiple quality choice equilibria. When ° is high,
there is partial di®erentiation similar to that when condition
C.2 is met and a similar explanation holds. We next present
the corollaries that show which market con¯gurations result
given the quality choice interval [²;y] and °.
Corollary 1. If C.1 holds both platforms enjoy positive
market share in the content provider market with the result-
ing market con¯guration depending on the investment ratio
I and °. In particular,
1. If 1 < I < ¡
21°¡17
2(3°¡5) then a covered market with an
interior solution is the outcome.
2. If ¡
21°¡17
2(3°¡5) · I < ¡
9°¡5
2(9°¡11) then a covered market with
a corner solution is the outcome.
3. If ¡
9°¡5
2(9°¡11) · I < ©, where © < 1, then an uncovered
market is the outcome.
Corollary 2. If C.2 or C.3 or C.4 holds, one platform
has all the market share in the content provider market, i.e.,
a pre-empted market is the outcome. This market con¯gu-
ration is independent of the investment ratio, I.
The ¯rst corollary shows that when ° is low, any of the three
market con¯gurations can occur depending on the quality
choice range. Since there is maximal di®erentiation, the
quality choice range can be proxied by the level of di®eren-
tiation between the platforms at the SPE, characterized by
the Investment ratio.When I is low, a covered market results
since the level of asymmetry is small and price competition
is intense. In contrast, high values of asymmetry result in an
uncovered market since the di®erentiation level is high and
price competition is relaxed. The second corollary shows
that for medium to high values of ° only a preempted mar-
ket results regardless of the asymmetry between platforms.
In this case, the relative di®erence in content provider qual-
ity is too low to be able to distinguish amongst them via
platform di®erentiation. Therefore, the ¯erce price compe-
tition results in a pre-empted market where all CP's °ock
to the high quality platform.
4. CONCLUSIONS
We study duopoly competition between two interconnected
ISP's in the presence of quality choice and service bottle
neck e®ects. We show that given two asymmetric platforms
(i.e. with di®erent quality levels), a price SPE on both sides
of the market exists. Moreover, we show that the higher the
asymmetry the more likely the CP market is to be uncovered
if ° is low. This suggests that highly di®erentiated platforms
provide a barrier to entry because of their market power.
Our ¯nal results show that a SPE exists for the Quality
choice game and the equilibrium involves di®erentiation in
quality. The level of di®erentiation depends on ° and the
quality choice interval. In addition, we also show the types
of market con¯gurations that result from the quality choices.
A limitation of our model is the assumption a ¯xed invest-
ment cost for quality (or costless quality choice). Neverthe-
less we believe that with low marginal costs of investment
the e®ects captured in this model will still hold. Moreover, in
certain cases ISP's can increase or lower their quality with-
out cost. For example once an ISP invests a ¯xed amount on
a router it can increase or decrease bandwidth(hence altering
quality) for certain tra±c types by simply setting parame-
ters at no additional costs.5. REFERENCES
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APPENDIX
A.
A.1 Best Replies
We ¯rst show that a symmetric equilibrium is not feasible.
Let j;i 2 f®;¯g and Bi(yj) be the set of y
¤
i 2 [²;y] such
that, y
¤
i 2 arg maxyi2[²;y] ¼j(yi;yj).
Lemma 1. Let yj 2 [²;y] then yj = 2 Bi(yj).
Proof. We show that given yj platform i never chooses
yi = yj and therefore a symmetric equilibrium is not possi-
ble. A symmetric argument applies for the other platform.
Assume yj 2 Bi(yj) so that yi = yj, then both platforms
would make zero pro¯ts because of Bertrand competition
on both sides of the market. We show that there exists
pro¯table deviations for platform i. We consider two cases:
Case I ² · yi = yj < y. Let platform i increase its quality
to yi + ± < y, where ± > 0; platform i becomes the high
quality platform. Results from Theorem 1
7 imply that the
resulting equilibrium price wi for the high quality platform
given the subgame (°;yi+±;yj) is less than the utility earned
7The full version of this Theorem gives the price character-
izations and can be found in the LIDS report.
by the highest quality content provider under all the market
con¯gurations, i.e., wi < °(qjyj + qiyi) for all ° > 1, there-
fore ri > 0. Moreover, from Theorem 1, we can show that
wi > wj ¸ 0. This implies that ¼i > 0. Thus platform i
would prefer to set quality yi = yj + ± instead of yi = yj.
Case II ² < yi = yj = y. Let platform i decrease its quality
to yi ¡ ± < y; platform i becomes the low quality platform.
Since the platforms are now di®erentiated, the price charged
to consumers by platform i is pi > 0 and qi = 1=3. Therefore
piqi+wiri = ¼i > 0 since wi ¸ 0. We conclude that platform
i would prefer to set quality yi = yj ¡² instead of yi = yj =
y.
Given quality choice y®, platform ¯ can choose a best reply
that depends on whether it acts as a high quality or a low
quality platform. In the former case it chooses a reply in the
domain (y®;y] and in the latter case it chooses a reply in the
domain [²;y®). In order to avoid confusion when platform ¯
is the high quality ¯rm we will change notation as follows; we
label the high(low) quality platform as h(l) and the quality
associated with it as yh(l).
A.1.1 Best reply in the domain (yl;y]
We will ¯rst analyze the best reply when platform ¯ chooses
a reply in the domain (y®;y]. In this case platform ¯ is the
high quality platform and is labeled as yh. We will show that
the pro¯t of the high quality ¯rm is increasing in quality in
every con¯guration. In Theorem 1 we have characterized
the conditions for various market con¯gurations to occur
in the price subgame as a function of °;yl and yh. These
characterizations can be viewed as restrictions on yh given
°; yl. When viewed as such the following hold,
1. Market is uncovered, with positive masses of consumers
on both platforms, in the in the price subgame whenever,
yh > ¡yl
9° ¡ 5
2(9° ¡ 11)
: (3)
2. Market is covered and a corner solution applies in the
price subgame whenever,
yh 2
·
¡yl
21° ¡ 17
2(3° ¡ 5)
;¡yl
9° ¡ 5
2(9° ¡ 11)
¸
; (4)
if 1 < ° ·
7
6;
yh 2
µ
¡yl
3° ¡ 1
2(3° ¡ 4)
;¡yl
9° ¡ 5
2(9° ¡ 11)
¸
; (5)
if
7
6 < ° <
22
18:
3. Market is covered and an interior solution applies in the
price subgame whenever,
yh 2
µ
yl;¡yl
21° ¡ 17
2(3° ¡ 5)
¶
: (6)
4. Market is preempted whenever,
yh 2
µ
yl;¡yl
3° ¡ 1
2(3° ¡ 4)
¸
; if
21
18 · ° <
24
18; (7)
° ¸
24
18
(8)
One can also deduce from the above that the uncovered con-
¯guration is possible only if 1 < ° <
22
18; a covered mar-ket con¯guration with a corner solution is possible only if
1 < ° <
24
18; a covered market con¯guration with an interior
solution is possible only if 1 < ° <
7
6; and preempted market
con¯guration is possible only if ° ¸
7
6. The following lemma
shows that the pro¯t of a high quality platform is increasing
in its quality in all con¯gurations.
Lemma 2. Given yl; ° and the domain (yl;y], the pro¯t
function ¼h(yl;yh) is increasing in yh for the market con¯g-
urations CI; CII; and CIV .
Proof. We show that for each con¯guration the pro¯t
function ¼h(yl;yh) is increasing in yh.
Uncovered Con¯guration CI: The pro¯t function in this
con¯guration is given by,
¼
u
h =
(yh(24° + 16) + yl(12° ¡ 1))
2(yh ¡ yl)
54(yl + 8yh)2 :
The derivative of the above function is positive for ° > 1
and yh > yl, hence the pro¯t function in this con¯guration
is increasing in yh.
Covered Con¯guration with corner solution CIII: The pro¯t
function in this con¯guration is given by,
¼
cc
h =
(yh(16° + 4) + yl(3° ¡ 13))
2
216(yh ¡ yl)
:
The second derivative of the above function is given by,
@
2¼
cc
h
@2yh
=
3y
2
l (1 ¡ 2° + °
2)
4(yh ¡ yl)3 :
The above derivative is positive for ° > 1 and yh > yl, which
implies that the function is convex under these restrictions.
Moreover, the pro¯t function ¼h has a single root at ~ y =
¡
yl(3°¡13)
2(3°+2) . Since ~ y < max
n
¡yl
3°¡1
2(3°¡4);¡yl
21°¡17
2(3°¡5)
o
hence
the pro¯t function in this con¯guration is increasing in yh.
Covered Con¯guration with interior solution CIII: The pro¯t
function in this con¯guration is given by,
¼
ci
h =
(6° + 11)
2(yh ¡ yl)
486
:
The derivative of the above function is given by,
@¼
ci
h
@yh
=
(6° + 11)
2
486
:
and the derivative is positive. Therefore the pro¯t function
is increasing in yh.
From Theorem 1 we can deduce that the preempted market
con¯guration CIV is possible whenever ° ¸
7
6: Several price
equilibria exist in this con¯guration depending on the tuple
(yh;yl;°). Given yl; and ° the correspondence W : R+ ¶
R+ gives the set of best response prices for each choice of
~ y 2 (yl;°]. When
7
6 · ° <
24
18; we can partition the set in
which yh lies into two. These are,
(yl;yl(9° ¡ 8)] and
·
yl(9° ¡ 8);¡yl
3° ¡ 1
2(3° ¡ 4)
¸
:
The set of prices in these two regions given the tuple yl;yh and °
are given below.
a.
7
6 · ° <
24
18 and (yl;yl(9° ¡ 8)].
We deduce from Theorem 1
8 that given ° in the above
range and yh in the above partition many price equilib-
ria exist. In particular, platform h will o®er the price,
wh =
1
3
(° ¡ 1)(yl + 2yh) ¡ c;
where,
c 2 [
(9° ¡ 8)
9
yl ¡
1
9
yh;
(3° ¡ 1)
9
yl +
(6° ¡ 8)
9
yh]:
The choice of c depends on the price that platform l will
pick. Speci¯cally, the highest price charged by platform
h for a particular yh is by
1
9(yh ¡ yl)(6° ¡ 5) and the
lowest price is given by
1
9(5 ¡ 3°)(yh ¡ yl).
b.
7
6 · ° <
24
18 and
h
yl(9° ¡ 8);¡yl
3°¡1
2(3°¡4)
i
In the second partition, we deduce from Theorem 1
that the highest price that platform h can charge is
wh =
1
3(°¡1)(yl+2yh): The lowest price that platform
h can charge at equilibrium for a particular yh is given
by
1
9(5 ¡ 3°)(yh ¡ yl).
When ° ¸
24
18 platform h will o®er the price, wh =
1
3(° ¡
1)(yl + 2yh) ¡ c; where,
c 2
·
max
½
(9° ¡ 8)
9
yl ¡
1
9
yh;0
¾
;
min
½
(3° ¡ 1)
9
yl +
(6° ¡ 8)
9
yh;(° ¡ 1)yl
¾¸
;
where c depends on the price o®ered by platform l. Given
(yl;°) the correspondence ¦ : R+ ¶ R+ gives the set of
pro¯t values that platform h can attain for each choice ~ y 2
(yl;y]. We de¯ne the set of pro¯t functions that have a
maximum over the domain (yl;y]. Let
P(yh) = f¼
p
h(yh)jl(yh) · ¼
p
h(yh) · g(yh)g:
where g(yh) = maxf
1
3(° ¡ 1)(yl + 2yh);
1
9(yh ¡ yl)(6° ¡ 5)g
and l(yh) = maxf
1
9(5¡3°)(yh ¡yl);
2
3(° ¡1)(yh ¡yl)g. We
will now show that if more than one market con¯guration is
possible, for a given interval (yl;y], given °, platform h will
prefer to pick yh = y
Lemma 3. Given yl; ° and an interval (yl;y] assume that
either (i) ° ·
7
6, or (ii) ° >
7
6 and
y
yl ¸ ¡
3°¡1
2(3°¡4), then the
best response, Bh(yl) = y.
Proof. It is su±cient to show that the pro¯t function is
increasing across the di®erent market con¯gurations under
the above assumptions. We partition the domain in which
° is de¯ned according to the types of market con¯gurations
that are possible for each °. We will then show that for each
of these partitions the pro¯t function is non decreasing in
yh.
8The full version of this Theorem gives the price character-
izations and can be found in the LIDS report.Case I: 1 < ° <
21
18; As previously stated, three market
con¯gurations are possible depending on the value of yh and
yl; these are uncovered, CI, covered with a corner solution
and covered with an interior solution, both of which are in
CIII. Given a ° in the above range, the domain (yl;1]
in which yh lies can be partitioned into three sets; each of
which corresponds to one of the three market con¯gurations.
These partitions are captured by the sets (3), (4) and (6).
By lemma 2, we know that pro¯ts are increasing in yh for
each partition. We will ¯rst show that the value of the pro¯t
function in the partition de¯ned in (3), is larger than any
pro¯t attained in the partition de¯ned in (4) and then show
that any pro¯t attained in the partition de¯ned in (6) is less
than that attained in (4).
To show the ¯rst result we compare the in¯mum value of the
pro¯t function in the uncovered con¯guration to the high-
est pro¯t attainable when platform h chooses yh such that
a covered market with a corner solution results (i.e, yh is
in the set speci¯ed by (4)). Let y
cc = ¡yl
9°¡5
2(9°¡11), it fol-
lows that limyh!ycc ¼
u
h(yh;yl) = ¼
cc
h (y
cc;yl). By lemma 2,
¼
u
h(yh;yl) > ¼
u
h(y
cc;yl) whenever yh lies in the set speci-
¯ed by the constraint (3). It also follows that ¼
u
h(yh;yl) >
¼
cc
h (~ y;yl) whenever ~ y is in the set speci¯ed by (4) since by
lemma 2, ¼
cc
h (ycc;yl) ¸ ¼
cc
h (~ y;yl).
To show the second result we compare the lowest value of
the pro¯t function in the covered con¯guration with a cor-
ner solution, to the supremum pro¯t value attained when
platform h chooses yh such that a covered market with an
interior solution results. The interval over which the covered
con¯guration with an interior solution, CIII, is de¯ned is
open. Let y
ci = ¡yl
21°¡17
2(3°¡5), since ¼
ci
h (y;yl) is right continu-
ous, the supremum of ¼
ci
h (y;yl) over the range in which this
con¯guration holds is given by ¼
ci
h (y
ci;yl). Moreover, it is
the case that ¼
cc
h (y
ci;yl) = ¼
ci
h (y
ci;yl). Therefore, it follows
from lemma 2, that ¼
cc
h (yh;yl) > ¼
ci
h (~ y;yl) whenever yh is in
the set speci¯ed by (4) and ~ y is in the set speci¯ed by (6).
Case II:
7
6 · ° <
22
18; When
7
6 · ° <
22
18 three market con-
¯gurations are possible depending on the value of yh and
yl; these are uncovered, CI, covered with a corner solution,
CIII, and a pre-empted market, CIV . Given a ° in the
above range, the domain (yl;1] in which yh lies can be par-
titioned into three sets each of which corresponds to one of
the three market con¯gurations. These partitions are cap-
tured by the sets (3), (5) and (7). We proceed in a similar
manner as we did for case I. By lemma 2 we know that prof-
its are increasing in yh for each partition. We will ¯rst show
that the value of the pro¯t function in the partition de¯ned
by the inequality (3), is larger than any pro¯t attained in
the partition de¯ned by (5) and then show that any pro¯t
attained in the partition de¯ned by (7) is less than that
attained in (5).
The ¯rst result is proved in the same way as it is done
in case I. To show the second result we compare the in-
¯mum value of the pro¯t function in the covered con¯gu-
ration with a corner solution to the pro¯t value attained
when platform h chooses yh such that a pre-empted market
results. Note the interval over which the covered con¯gu-
ration with a corner solution, CIII, is de¯ned is open on
its lower limit. Let y
p = ¡yl
3°¡1
2(3°¡4), since ¼
cc
h (y;yl) is left
continuous the in¯mum of ¼
cc
h (y;yl) over the range in which
this con¯guration is de¯ned is ¼
cc
h (y
p;yl). By plugging in
yh = y
p into ¼
cc
h (yh;yl) and ¼
p
h(yh;yl) we determine that
the limyh!yp ¼
cc
h (y
p;yl) = ¼
p
h(y
p;yl). Note that for any
¼
p
h(yh) 2 P(yh) if yh ¸ ¡yl
3°¡1
2(3°¡4) then ¼
p
h(yh) is single
valued, see the price characterization in Theorem 1. More-
over, ¼
p
h(y
p;yl) ¸ ~ ¼
p
h(yh;yl) where ~ ¼
p
h(yh;yl) 2 P(yh) and
yh · ¡yl
3°¡1
2(3°¡4). Therefore, it follows from lemma 2, that
¼
cc
h (yh;yl) > ¼
p
h(~ y;yl) when yh is in the set speci¯ed by (5)
and ~ y is in the set speci¯ed by ( 7).
Case III:
22
18 · ° <
24
18; When ° falls in the above range two
market con¯gurations are possible depending on the value of
yh and yl; these are covered with a corner solution, CIII and
a pre-empted market, CIV . The domain (yl;1] in which
yh lies can be partitioned into two sets each of which cor-
responds to one of the two market con¯gurations. These
partitions are captured by sets (5) and (7). By lemma 2, we
know that pro¯ts are increasing in yh in the partition where
a con¯guration CIII is de¯ned, i.e in the set (5). Showing
that the value of the pro¯t function in the partition de¯ned
by (5), is larger than any pro¯t attained in the partition
de¯ned in (7) employs the same proof that is used to show
the second result for case II above. Therefore, given that
platform l picks yl < y and platform h chooses to be a high
quality platform, platform h chooses its best response to be
y.
Lemma 4. Given yl; ° and an interval (yl;y]. Assume
that
i.
7
6 · ° <
4
3 then the best response, Bh(yl) 2 [f(y;yl);y]
where
f(y;yl) =
(
(9¡3°)y+(6°¡7)yl
3°+2 if y 2 (yl;yl
4°+3¡9°2
°¡3 ];
(9¡3°)y¡(3°¡1)yl
3°+1 if y 2 [yl
4°+3¡9°2
°¡3 ;¡yl
3°¡1
2(3°¡4)]:
ii. ° ¸
4
3 then the best response, Bh(yl) 2 [f(y;yl);y] where
f(y;yl) =
(
(1+3°)y+yl
3°+2 if y 2 (yl;yl
¡6°¡17+27°2
3°+1 ];
(1+3°)y¡(°¡1)9yl
3°+1 if y 2 [yl
¡6°¡17+27°2
3°+1 ;1):
Proof. We give a general outline on how to prove each
of the above cases. Given y 2 [Cyl;Kyl], where C and
K are the relevant constants given in the hypothesis. The
least pro¯t that platform h can make is given by l(y) where
l(yh) 2 P(yh). This follows from the fact that l(yh) is an in-
creasing function of yh. Let ~ P(yh) = f¼
p
h(yh)jmaxyh ¼
p
h(yh) ¸
l(y)g. We ¯nd the minimum value of ~ y in the domain (yl;y]
such that maxyh ¼
p
h(yh) ¸ l(y) where ¼
p
h(yh) 2 ~ P(yh), i.e.
~ y = minyh
s.t.
X
¼
p
h(yh)2 ~ P(yh)
1¼
p
h(yh)¸l(y) > 0
Since the correspondence ¦ is convex valued (this follows
from the convexity of W) we ¯nd that ~ y = yh where g(yh) =
l(y). Therefore the best response Bh(yl) = f(y;yl) lies in the
set given by [~ y;y], where,f(y;yl) = argmax¼
p
h(yh) and ¼
p
h(yh) 2
~ P(yh):A.1.2 Best reply in the domain [²;yh)
We will follow a similar approach to that used in section
A.1.1. Given yh, we will compute ¯rm l's best reply. We
will show that the pro¯t for the low quality ¯rm is decreasing
in yl across all con¯gurations which are possible whenever
1 < ° · 7=6 or ° > 4=3. This will help us infer that the
low quality platform chooses ² as its best response in those
ranges. For the range, 21=18 · ° < 24=18, we show that the
lower quality platform chooses the maximum between ² and
a fraction of the quality chosen by the high quality platform.
Since the choice of yl by the low quality ¯rm determines the
market con¯guration we de¯ne the critical limits for which
the various con¯gurations exist given yh.
1. Market is uncovered, with positive masses of consumers
on both platforms, in the in the price subgame whenever,
yl < ¡yh
2(9° ¡ 11)
9° ¡ 5
: (9)
2. Market is covered and a corner solution applies in the
price subgame whenever,
yl 2
·
¡yh
2(9° ¡ 11)
9° ¡ 5
;¡yh
2(3° ¡ 5)
21° ¡ 17
;
¸
; (10)
if 1 < ° ·
7
6;
yl 2
·
¡yh
2(9° ¡ 11)
9° ¡ 5
;¡yh
2(3° ¡ 4)
3° ¡ 1
¶
; (11)
if
7
6 < ° ·
22
18:
3. Market is covered and an interior solution applies in the
price subgame whenever,
yl 2
µ
¡yh
2(3° ¡ 5)
21° ¡ 17
;yh
¶
: (12)
4. Market is preempted whenever,
yl 2
·
¡yh
2(3° ¡ 4)
3° ¡ 1
;yh
¶
; if
21
18 · ° <
24
18; (13)
° ¸
24
18
(14)
Lemma 5. Given yh; ° and yl 2 [²;yh], the pro¯t func-
tion ¼l(yl;yh) is decreasing in yl for all market con¯gura-
tions for which it is de¯ned.
Proof. We show that for each con¯guration the pro¯t
function ¼l(yl;yh) is decreasing in yl.
Uncovered Con¯guration CII: The denote the pro¯t func-
tion in this con¯guration by ¼
u
l , One can show that if the
quality parameter is in the range 1 < ° <
22
18
@¼u
l
@yl < 0:
Hence the pro¯t function in this con¯guration is decreasing
in yl.
Covered Con¯guration with corner solution CIII: The pro¯t
function in this con¯guration is denoted by ¼
cc
l , One can
show that the above derivative is negative when yl lies in
the set speci¯ed in (10) is satis¯ed and ° > 1. Hence the
pro¯t function in this con¯guration is decreasing in yl.
Covered Con¯guration with interior solution CIII: The pro¯t
function in this con¯guration is given by, ¼
ci
l =
(103+36°¡84°)
486(yh¡yl) :
The derivative of the above function is given by,
@¼ci
l
@yl =
¡
103
486 ¡
2
27°
2 +
14
81°: The above derivative is negative there-
fore the pro¯t function is decreasing in yl when yl lies in the
set speci¯ed in (12).
Pre-empted Con¯guration CIV : The pro¯t function in this
con¯guration is given by, ¼
p
l =
2
9yh ¡
2
9yl: The derivative of
the above function is given by,
@¼
p
l
@yl =
¡2
9 : The above deriva-
tive is negative therefore the pro¯t function is decreasing in
yl when this con¯guration is de¯ned.
We will now show that given yh and °, and the strategy
space El = [²;yh) platform l will prefer to pick ² whenever
1 < ° <
7
6.
Lemma 6. Given yh; 1 < ° ·
7
6, and a strategy space El
then Bl(yh) = ².
Proof. As previously stated in section A.1.1 three mar-
ket con¯gurations are possible when 1 < ° <
21
18; these are
uncovered (CI), covered with a corner solution and covered
with an interior solution (both of which are in con¯guration
CIII). Given a ° in the above range, the domain [²;yh) in
which yl lies can be partitioned into three sets, each of which
corresponds to one of the three market con¯gurations. These
partitions are captured in (9), (10) and (12). By lemma 5,
we know that pro¯ts are decreasing in yl for each partition.
We will ¯rst show that the value of the pro¯t function in the
partition de¯ned in (9), is larger than any pro¯t attained in
the partition de¯ned in (10) whenever both partitions are
de¯ned given ² and yh. Similarly, we show that any pro¯t
attained when yl lies in the partition de¯ned by the con-
straint in (12) is not greater than that attained when yl lies
in the partition speci¯ed by (10).
To show the ¯rst result we compare the in¯mum value of the
pro¯t function in the uncovered con¯guration to the highest
possible pro¯t attained when platform l chooses yl such that
a covered market with a corner solution results (i.e, yl is in
the set speci¯ed in (10)). Let y
cc
l = ¡yh
2(9°¡11)
9°¡5 , it follows
that limyl!ycc
l ¼
u
l (yl;yh) = ¼
cc
l (y
cc
l ;yh) (Since ¼
u
l is right
continuous, the limit exists). Since ¼
u
l (yl;yh) > ¼
u
l (y
cc
l ;yh)
when yl satis¯es the inequality in (9), it also follows from
lemma 5 that ¼
u
l (yl;yh) > ¼
cc
l (~ y;yh) when ~ y lies in the set
speci¯ed in (10).
To show the second result, we compare the lowest value of
the pro¯t function in the covered con¯guration with a cor-
ner solution to the supremum pro¯t value attained when
platform l chooses yl such that a covered market with an in-
terior solution results. The interval over which the covered
con¯guration with an interior solution, CIII, is de¯ned is
open. Let y
ci
l = ¡yl
2(3°¡5)
21°¡17 , we de¯ne the supremum of
¼
ci
l (yl;yh) over the range in which this con¯guration is de-
¯ned as ¼
ci
l (y
ci
l ;yh). We note that y
ci
l is the in¯mum of
the interval over which this con¯guration is de¯ned, there-
fore limyl!yci
l ¼
ci
l (yl;yh) = ¼
ci
l (y
ci
l ;yh) since ¼
ci
l (yh;yl) isleft continuous. By plugging in yl = y
ci
l into ¼
cc
l (yl;yh) we
note that ¼
cc
l (y
ci
l ;yh) = ¼
ci
l (y
ci
l ;yh). Therefore, it follows
from lemma 5, that ¼
cc
l (yh;yl) > ¼
ci
l (~ y;yh) when yl satis¯es
the constraint in (10) and ~ y satis¯es equation (12). There-
fore, given that platform h picks yh, platform l chooses to
be a low quality platform and picks ² as its response.
Lemma 7. Given yh;
7
6 < ° <
22
18 and the strategy space
El then Bl(yh) = maxf²;¡yh
2(3°¡4)
3°¡1 g.
Proof. As shown in section A.1.1 when
7
6 · ° <
22
18 three
market con¯gurations are possible depending on the value
of yh and yl; these are uncovered, CI, covered with a corner
solution, CIII, and a pre-empted market, CIV . Given a °
in the above range, the domain [²;yh) in which yl lies can
be partitioned into three sets each of which corresponds to
one of the three market con¯gurations. These partitions are
captured in (9), (11) and (13). We proceed in a similar
manner as we did for the previous Lemma. By lemma 5 we
know that pro¯ts are decreasing in yl for each partition. We
will ¯rst show that the value of the pro¯t function in the
partition de¯ned by (9), is larger than any pro¯t attained in
the partition de¯ned in (11). We then show that any pro¯t
attained in the partitions de¯ned in (11) or (9) is less than
that attained by the maximum pro¯t in the partition de¯ned
in (13).
The ¯rst result is proved in the same way as it is done in
Lemma 6. To show the second result we compare the in-
¯mum value of the pro¯t function in the covered con¯gu-
ration with a corner solution to the pro¯t value attained
when platform l chooses a yl such that a pre-empted market
results. Note the interval over which the covered con¯gu-
ration with a corner solution, CIII, is de¯ned is open on
its upper limit. Let y
p
l = ¡yh
2(3°¡4)
3°¡1 , we de¯ne the in¯-
mum of ¼
cc
l (y;yl) over the range in which this con¯guration
is de¯ned as ¼
cc
l (y
p
l ;yh). Since ¼
cc
l (y;yh) is right continuous
limyl!y
p
l ¼
cc
l (yl;yh) = ¼
cc
l (y
p
l ;yh). Note y
p
l is the supremum
of the range. By plugging in yl = y
p
l into the pro¯t func-
tions under a covered market (with a corner solution) and
a pre-empted market, we ¯nd that ¼
cc
l (y
p
l ;yh) < ¼
p
l (y
p
l ;yh).
This implies that the pro¯t function is discontinuous across
these two market con¯gurations at this point. We now show
that limyl!0 ¼
u
l (yh;yl) < ¼
p
l (y
p
l ;yh). We note that ¼
u
l (yh;²)
is a continuous function in ² and the limit as ² ! 0 ex-
ists. We de¯ne lim²!0 ¼
u
l (yh;²) = ¼
u
l (0;yh). It follows that
¼
u
l (0;yh) ¡ ¼
p
l (y
p
l ;yh) is given by,
yh(9°
2 ¡ 105° + 106)
54(3° ¡ 1)
;
which is negative when
7
6 < ° <
22
18. Therefore it follows
from Lemma 5, that ¼
cc
l (yh;yl) < ¼
p
l (y
p
l ;yh) when yl is the
partition speci¯ed in (11). Moreover, ¼
p
l (y
p
l ;yh) > ¼
u
l (yh; ~ y)
for any ~ y that falls in the partition speci¯ed in (9). There-
fore, the best response given yh is the maxf²;¡yh
2(3°¡4)
3°¡1 g.
Lemma 8. Given yh;
22
18 · ° <
24
18 and the strategy space
El, then Bl(yh) = max
n
²;¡yh
2(3°¡4)
3°¡1
o
.
Proof. When ° falls in the above range two market con-
¯gurations are possible depending on the value of yh and
yl; these are a covered market with a corner solution, CIII
and a pre-empted market, CIV . Given a ° in the above
range, the domain [²;yh) in which yl lies can be partitioned
into two sets each of which corresponds to one of the two
market con¯gurations. These partitions are captured in (11)
and (13). We proceed in a similar manner as we did for the
previous Lemma 7. We will show that any pro¯t attained in
the partition de¯ned in Eq. (11) is less than that attained
by the maximum pro¯t in the partition de¯ned in Eq. (13).
This proof is analogous to the proof for the second result in
lemma 7. Therefore the same results apply, in particular,
when ² < ¡yh
2(3°¡4)
3°¡1 platform l picks yl = ¡yh
2(3°¡4)
3°¡1 and
when ² ¸ ¡yh
2(3°¡4)
3°¡1 platform l picks yl = ².
For ° >
24
18 only the pre-empted market con¯guration exists
and by Lemma 5 the pro¯t is decreasing in yl. Therefore
given that platform h picks yh > 0, platform l best response
in the domain [²;yh) is ².
A similar analysis to that carried out in the previous two
subsections also applies when determining the set in which
platform ®
0s best replies lie given platform ¯
0s choice.
A.2 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
We show for each of these regions the sets in which the best
reply responses lie and where they intersect thus determining
the subgame perfect equilibria.
1. 1 < ° <
7
6: Platform's ¯ best reply given y® is de¯ned
as,
B¯(y®) =
8
> > <
> > :
²; if ² < y® < y and ¼
l
¯(²;y®) ¸ ¼
h
¯(y;y®);
y; if ² < y® < y and ¼
l
¯(²;y®) · ¼
h
¯(y;y®);
²; if y® = y,
y; if y® = ².
Platform's ®
0s best reply given y¯ is similarly de¯ned.
Note that ¼
h
¯ and ¼
l
¯ refer to the relevant pro¯t func-
tions when platform ¯ acts as a high and low quality
platform respectively.
yα ￿
￿
y
y
yβ
Figure 2: The red line (dotted line) is the set in
which best responses for platform ¯(®) lie. These
sets intersect only at (²;y) and (y;²).
It follows that any subgame perfect equilibrium when
1 < ° <
7
6 entails one ¯rm choosing y and the otherchoosing ². The resulting market con¯guration depends
on the investment ratio I =
y
² and the value of °.
Figure 2, shows the sets that contain the best responses
and the points where they intersect.
2.
7
6 · ° <
24
18 and
y
² ¸ ¡
(3°¡1)
2(3°¡4): Platform's ¯ best reply
given y® is de¯ned as,
B¯(y®) =
8
> > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > :
²; if ² · y® < ¡²
3°¡1
2(3°¡4)
and ¼
l
¯(²;y®) ¸ ¼
h
¯(y;y®);
y®
2(3°¡4)
3°¡1 ; if ¡²
3°¡1
2(3°¡4) · y® · y
and ¼
l
¯(²;y®) ¸ ¼
h
¯(y;y®);
y; if ² · y® < y
2(3°¡4)
3°¡1
and ¼
l
¯(²;y®) · ¼
h
¯(y;y®);
f(y;y®); if y
2(3°¡4)
3°¡1 · y® < y
and ¼
l
¯(²;y®) · ¼
h
¯(y;y®);
Where f(y;y®) is as de¯ned in Lemma 4.
￿
￿
y
yα
−￿
3γ−1
2(3γ−4)
−￿
3γ−1
2(3γ−4)
−2(3γ−4)
3γ−1 y
−2(3γ−4)
3γ−1 y
y
yβ
Figure 3: The red (blue) points show the sets in
which best responses for platform ¯(®) lie. These
sets intersect only at (¡y
2(3°¡4)
3°¡1 ;y) and (y;¡y
2(3°¡4)
3°¡1 ).
Figure 3 represents the sets where the best responses
lie in the case
y
² = I ¸ ¡
3°¡1
2(3°¡4). These sets intersect
only at the points (¡y
2(3°¡4)
3°¡1 ;y) and (y;¡y
2(3°¡4)
3°¡1 ) as
shown in the diagram. These points form a SPE; this
follows from Lemma 7 and 3 together with the fact that
y
² ¸ ¡
(3°¡1)
2(3°¡4). The high quality platform invests in the
highest possible quality whilst the low quality platform
is a fraction of the investment by the high quality plat-
form. Therefore, the investment quality pair at the
SPE is given by fy;¡y
2(3°¡4)
3°¡1 g.
3.
7
6 · ° <
24
18 and
y
² · ¡
(3°¡1)
2(3°¡4): Platform's ¯ best reply
given y® is de¯ned as,
B¯(y®) =
½
²; if ² · y® < y and ¼
l
¯(²;y®) ¸ ¼
h
¯(y;y®);
~ y; if ² · y® < y and ¼
l
¯(²;y®) · ¼
h
¯(y;y®);
Where ~ y 2 [f(y;y®);y] and f(y;y®) is as de¯ned in
Lemma 4.
Figure 4 represents the sets where the best responses
lie in the case
y
² = I < ¡
3°¡1
2(3°¡4). These sets intersect
only at (~ y;²) and (²; ~ y) where ~ y 2 [f(y;²);y] as shown
in the diagram. These points form a SPE; this follow
from Lemma 7 and 4 together with the fact that
y
² <
¡
(3°¡1)
2(3°¡4). The high quality platform invests in a ~ y 2
[f(y;²);y] whilst the low quality platform chooses the
lowest quality available.
f(y,￿) yα y
y
f(y,￿)
￿
￿
￿
4γ+3−9γ2
γ−3
￿
4γ+3−9γ2
γ−3
yβ
Figure 4: The red (blue) points show the sets in
which best responses for platform ¯(®) lie. These
sets intersect only at (~ y;²) and (²; ~ y) where ~ y 2
[f(y;²);y].
4. ° ¸
4
3: Platform's ¯ best reply given y® is de¯ned as,
B¯(y®) =
½
²; if ² · y® < y and ¼
l
¯(²;y®) ¸ ¼
h
¯(y;y®);
~ y; if ² · y® < y and ¼
l
¯(²;y®) · ¼
h
¯(y;y®);
Where ~ y 2 [f(y;y®);y] and f(y;y®) is as de¯ned in
Lemma 4.
f(y,￿) yα y
y
f(y,￿)
￿
￿
￿
−6γ−17+27γ2
3γ+1
￿
−6γ−17+27γ2
3γ+1
yβ
Figure 5: The red (blue) points show the sets in
which best responses for platform ¯(®) lie. These
sets intersect only at (~ y;²) and (²; ~ y) where ~ y 2
[f(y;²);y].
Figure 5 represents the sets where the best responses
lie. These sets intersect only at (~ y;²) and (²; ~ y) where
~ y 2 [f(y;²);y] as shown in the diagram. These points
form a SPE; this follow from Lemma 7 and 4. The high
quality platform invests in a ~ y 2 [f(y;²);y] whilst the
low quality platform chooses the lowest quality avail-
able. Platform's ®
0s best reply given y¯ is similarly
de¯ned. It follows that any subgame perfect equilib-
rium when ° ¸
24
18 entails one ¯rm choosing ~ y and the
other choosing ².